Hizb ut-Tahrir's Jordanian branch was not an informal association of study circles. It was organized through local committees, a national Wilayah, a recognized Mu'tamid and specialist offices responsible for communications, political activities, culture and media. Above the country structure stood the international leadership and its Amir. Delegates known as Mandoobs could be sent to assess operations and convey instructions.
The system had a logical purpose. Localities were supposed to understand the areas in which they operated. National officials were supposed to consolidate that knowledge, identify weaknesses and direct resources. Representatives of the Amir were supposed to supply an additional perspective. At the top, the Amir would have the information needed to judge whether the party's work was preparing society for its declared objective: the establishment of a Khilafah.
Jordan also had a direct relationship with the party's senior leadership. Ata Abu al-Rashta held responsibilities in its organization before becoming Amir. The division of 1997 brought elections and changes in the national leadership. Media and central committees later developed under the new leadership. The important point was not the number of offices created, but whether those offices improved the quality of decisions.
The flow of reports exposed an institutional weakness. National officials could receive different figures from the same locality. A visiting representative might discuss those figures with the very people who had supplied them. When a discrepancy reached the center, the response depended on whether anyone in authority was prepared to press for an explanation and act on it.
The result was a chain of responsibility that functioned more reliably as a chain of transmission. Instructions moved downward. Statistics moved upward. What was missing was a dependable method of finding out whether the statistics described real influence beyond the party's own membership.