The party's strategy carried a human cost in places where political confrontation brought severe repression. Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, raised questions about what members were being asked to achieve when the prospect of establishing the party's proposed state was remote.
The leadership continued directing political work while followers faced imprisonment and violence. The unresolved issue was what particular action would turn their exposure to danger into a plausible political result. A movement cannot evaluate a strategy by the number of members arrested if it cannot explain what those arrests changed.
The same question applied in Jordan. Statements that provoked the authorities could demonstrate a willingness to confront rulers, but provocation did not automatically create public support. Repeating an activity because it produced an arrest risked turning punishment into the only visible result the party could report.
Political commitment sometimes involves risk. But the responsibility of leadership is to assess whether a chosen method advances the objective for which members are sacrificing. Where that connection cannot be explained, courage at the bottom becomes a substitute for strategy at the top.
A party capable of cataloging arrests but unable to measure social influence was again confusing activity with achievement.