The same substitution of volume for influence affected Hizb ut-Tahrir's published material. The party treated its literature as an instrument for spreading political ideas. Yet distributing a magazine was not the same as having its arguments read, understood or accepted by society.
In Jordan, the number of copies of Al-Waie circulated through the organization declined from roughly 4,000 to 2,000, then to 1,000 and eventually to approximately 800. Even at the lower figure, officials could still speak about quantities distributed. The unresolved question was what happened to the copies after members received them.
Some were kept at home or passed among relatives. Other members took copies without demonstrating that they read the material themselves. The act of collecting a publication became a convenient way to satisfy the requirements of a distribution exercise, even when there was little evidence of new intellectual engagement beyond the existing circle.
The problem reached the officials tasked with advancing the work. At a leadership gathering, questions about the magazine's actual readership exposed a gap between the organization's insistence on circulating it and the attention paid to it by the people responsible for that circulation.
The same weakness appeared in the method of distributing political leaflets. Statements could be produced and handed out, then discarded by the public. Repeating the procedure did not make it more effective. A party could claim continued activity while its message failed to take root outside its own meetings.
This was the difference between an administrative achievement and a political one. Printing, mailing and counting could all be completed successfully. None of those operations, on their own, demonstrated that Hizb ut-Tahrir had moved closer to winning society's confidence.